Pace Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 3 Summer 2013

Article 4

July 2013

Neither Panacea, Placebo, Nor Poison: Examining the Rise of AntiUnemployment Discrimination Laws
Seth Katsuya Endo

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Seth Katsuya Endo, Neither Panacea, Placebo, Nor Poison: Examining the Rise of AntiUnemployment Discrimination Laws, 33 Pace L. Rev. 1007 (2013)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Neither Panacea, Placebo, Nor
Poison: Examining the Rise of
Anti-Unemployment
Discrimination Laws
Seth Katsuya Endo*
I.

Introduction

Since 2009, the unemployment rate in the United States
has remained above eight percent, which means that more
than twelve million individuals have been looking for work at
any given time. With so many affected individuals,
unemployment has become an issue of public concern,
particularly as stories describing employers refusing to
consider currently unemployed candidates for job opportunities
have proliferated. In response to these trends, about twenty
states and the federal government have passed, or are
considering, legislation designed to prohibit employers from
discriminating against individuals based on their employment
status.
Although several bills already have been enacted to date,
nearly all of the articles on this subject have been authored by
members of various law firms’ employment practices.1 These
articles primarily focus on the legislative activity, discussing
what employers need to know to anticipate and avoid liability.
The one scholarly article that deals with this issue takes the
mirror-image approach in that it primarily echoes the policy
positions of employee-rights advocates and does not examine

* Seth Katsuya Endo received his J.D. from New York University School
of Law in 2007. In addition to working in private practice, he has clerked for
several federal and state judges.
1. See, e.g., Katharine H. Parker & Daniel L. Saperstein, Emerging
Issues in Hiring—Employer Screening Processes, 18 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL &
PRACTICAL GUIDANCE 5, art. 2, (Sept./Oct. 2012).
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the specifics of any of the proposed or enacted bills.2
The goal of this Article is to survey the legislative activity,
identify the factors driving it, and analyze its potential
ramifications. I contend that it is unreasonable to project that
this legislation will significantly reduce unemployment because
there is only anecdotal data regarding the prevalence of
discrimination against unemployed candidates in hiring and,
regardless of the frequency of such a practice, none of the
proposed or enacted legislation directly promotes job creation.
However, I argue that the anti-unemployment discrimination
legislation is a positive example of interest convergence in that
it benefits the economy by reducing arbitrary discrimination in
hiring and long-term unemployment. Furthermore, such
legislation expresses a set of positive societal values and
protects members of constitutionally-protected groups who are
likely disproportionately impacted by current-employment
requirements. I then discuss why the concerns advanced by the
business community are overstated given the generally limited
scope of the legislation, the lack of a private right of action, and
the legally-approved uses of employment status as a proxy for
characteristics about which a business might reasonably care.
In sum, when taking an objective look, the anti-unemployment
discrimination legislation is neither panacea, placebo, nor
poison.
II. Background
A. Unemployment in the U.S.
In January 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimated that more than twelve million Americans, or about
eight percent of the civilian labor force, were unemployed.3
Approximately five million of these individuals had been out of
2. See Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Have a Job to Get a Job: Disparate Treatment
and Disparate Impact of the “Currently Employed” Requirement, 18 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 189 (2012).
3. News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment
SituationJanuary
2013,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_02012013.pdf.
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work for more than twenty-seven weeks.4
In terms of distribution, the unemployment rate for whites
was 7 percent, while the rates for blacks and Hispanics were
13.8 and 9.7 percent, respectively.5 The unemployment rates
for adult men and for adult women were both 7.3 percent.6 The
unemployment rate for the disabled was 13.7 percent against
8.3 percent for individuals without any disabilities.7 On the
whole, unemployment rates for older individuals was slightly
lower than the rates for their younger cohorts but a much
larger percentage of older unemployed individuals are longterm unemployed.8
Political polls reflect these numbers with unemployment
dominating as an area of concern. In September 2012, seventytwo percent of respondents in a national Gallup poll stated that
economic problems are the most important problem facing the
country today.9 Thirty-two percent of the total respondents
specifically identified “unemployment/jobs.”10 In a related
Gallup poll, more than three-quarters of respondents said that
it is a bad time to find a quality job.11 Black, Hispanic, senior,
and low-income respondents were particularly concerned about
unemployment.12

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at Table A-6.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE
CURRENT
POPULATION
SURVEY
(Feb.
5,
2013),
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat03.htm; see also Sylvia Allegretto & Devon
Lynch, Unemployment and Long-Term Unemployment: The Composition of
the Unemployed and Long-Term Unemployed In Tough Labor Markets, 133
MONTHLY
LAB.
REV.
3
(Oct.
2010),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/10/art1full.pdf.
9. See
Most
Important
Problem,
GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1675/Most-Important-Problem.aspx (last visited
Apr. 16, 2013).
10. See Id.
11. See Lydia Saad, U.S. Perceptions of Job Market Remain Weak but
Improved,
GALLUP
(June
13,
2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155171/Perceptions-Job-Market-Remain-WeakImproved.aspx.
12. See Lydia Saad, In U.S., Jobs a More Glaring Issue for Some Groups
Than
Others,
GALLUP
(June
27,
2012),

3
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B. Rising Perception that Prospective Employers Discriminate
Against Unemployed Candidates
In late May 2010, a staffing agency advertised a position
with Sony Ericsson in Atlanta that stated, “Candidates MUST
be currently working for an original consumer electronics
manufacturer in marketing. NO EXCEPTIONS.”13 Shortly
thereafter, the advertisement came to the attention of the
Orlando Sentinel, which ran an article questioning the
employer’s practice of excluding candidates based on their
employment status.14 A spokesperson for Sony Ericsson quickly
explained that there had been a miscommunication with the
recruiter and that the language in the advertisement was a
mistake.15
A handful of articles discussing this practice quickly
followed, although actual data remained anecdotal.16 For
example, a New York Post columnist detailed the story of
Andrea Altieri, an individual with years of work experience
and a master’s degree, who was shocked to encounter a job
posting in her area that required proof of “current W-2
income.”17 The piece further observed that a search through a
job-listing aggregator website showed that a number of job
advertisements in the New York City area required applicants
to be currently working for positions, such as sales
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155375/Jobs-Glaring-Issue-GroupsOthers.aspx.
13. Jim Stratton, You’re Out of Work? Don’t Apply for This Job, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 3, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 11354998.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Liz Wolgemuth, How to Get a Job After a Year (or More)
Out of Work, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 10, 2010,
http://money.usnews.com/money/careers/articles/2010/06/10/how-to-get-a-jobafter-a-year-or-more-out-of-work; Barbara Shelly, Unemployed Need Support
from
Congress,
KAN.
CITY
STAR,
July
12,
2010,
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/opinion/shelly-unemployed-needsupport-from-congress/nRwGZ/.
17. See Chris Erikson, The Scarlet U – Why Employers Favor Candidates
with Jobs Over the Unemployed; A Stacked Deck, N.Y. POST, July 26, 2010, at
35, available at 2010 WLNR 14857453.
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representative and bank office manager.18 Several job
recruiters commented on the prevalence of this practice and
bias.19
Despite the instances of discrimination against the
unemployed being only anecdotal, the reaction to the news has
been strong. For example, an article on the topic published on
the Huffington Post received over 3,000 comments.20
Furthermore, an October 2010 article in the Atlanta JournalConstitution focused on people’s sense of outrage at the
practice.21 A common refrain was that it should be illegal.22
In June 2011, in a national survey conducted by Hart
Research Associates, eighty percent of respondents described
the refusal to consider unemployed job applicants as “very
unfair.”23 Almost two-thirds of respondents said they favored a
congressional proposal to make “it illegal for companies to
refuse to hire or consider a qualified job applicant solely
because the person is currently unemployed.”24
With this backdrop, and as a presidential election
approached,25 federal, state, and city officials have proposed

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Dan Chapman, Long-Term Jobless Told Not to Apply, ATLANTA
J.—CONST., Oct. 4, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 19654528.
22. Id.
23. National Employment Law Project, Hiring Discrimination Against
the Unemployed: Federal Bill Outlaws Excluding the Unemployed From Job
Opportunities, as Discriminatory Ads Persist (July 12, 2011), available at
http://nelp.3cdn.net/b4ade339e970088d72_alm6blqx8.pdf.
24. Id.
25. See Chuck Leddy, A Nonpartisan Primer on Jobs and Politics, BOS.
GLOBE, March 21, 2012, at G4, available at 2012 WLNR 5966618 (“In this
election year, polls have consistently shown that one thing is clear in the
minds of Americans: The most important issues are the economy and
unemployment.”); Ewen MacAskill, Obama Turns Up Heat on Romney Over
Corporate Past, GUARDIAN, July 13, 2012, at 26, available at 2012 WLNR
14576455 (“The issue is significant because the Obama campaign claims that
after 1999, Bain Capital, an investment vehicle, was involved in layoffs,
bankruptcies and the outsourcing of American jobs to China, Mexico and
elsewhere. The remarks are a potent charge in a tight election—Obama and
Romney are neck-and-neck in the polls—in which unemployment is the main
issue.”).

5
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bills to address the perceived problem.26
C. The Legislative Responses
1.

State and Local Responses

State and local legislators have been quick to propose
legislation to address the perceived problem of employers
discriminating against unemployed candidates in hiring. New
Jersey and Oregon passed bills that regulate job
advertisements. The District of Columbia passed a broader bill
that also prohibits employers from using employment status as
a basis for hiring decisions. More than a dozen other states
have considered or are considering legislation. The trend
appears to show that expansive bills face a more difficult path
than narrower ones.
a. New Jersey
On March 29, 2010, New Jersey passed a statute aimed at
stopping employers from discriminating against the
unemployed, enacting the legislation within six months of the
bill’s introduction in the state assembly.27 The legislative
process illustrates some of the competing considerations at
play, including Governor Chris Christie voicing concerns about
excess regulation and the legislature seeking to protect the
unemployed.
On October 7, 2010, Democrat Assemblyman Peter Barnes
proposed a bill that would prohibit an employer or its agent
from publishing job vacancies that prohibit or suggest that
unemployed individuals should not apply for the advertised
positions.28 Eleven days later, the state assembly passed the
proposed bill by a 58-to-18 margin with two abstentions. 29 On

26. See Parker & Saperstein, supra note 1.
27. Assemb. B. 3359, 214th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2010), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/A3500/3359_I1.PDF.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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November 8, 2010, the state senate received the proposed bill,
which was in less than two weeks later by a vote of 29-to-6. 30
The original proposal stated:
1. No
employer
or
employer’s
agent,
representative, or designee shall publish, in print
or on the Internet, an advertisement for any job
vacancy that contains one or more of the
following:
a. Any provision stating or suggesting
that the qualifications for a job include
current employment;
b. Any provision stating or suggesting
that the employer or employer’s agent,
representative, or designee will not
consider or review an application for
employment submitted by any job
applicant currently unemployed; or
c. Any provision stating or suggesting that
the employer or employer’s agent,
representative, or designee will only
consider or review applications for
employment submitted by job applicants
who are currently employed.
2. Any employer who violates this act shall be
subject to a civil penalty in an amount not to
exceed $5,000 for the first violation and $10,000
for each subsequent violation, collectible by the
Commissioner
of
Labor
and
Workforce
Development in a summary proceeding pursuant
to the “Penalty Enforcement Law of 1999,”
P.L.1999, c.274 (C.2A:58-10 et seq.).

30. Id.

7
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3. This act shall take effect immediately.31
On January 6, 2011, Governor Christie returned the bill
with several recommendations.32 Specifically, Christie voiced
his concerns that the bill would harm the state’s business
community by subjecting it to “significant fines, penalties and
unwarranted litigation without requiring a finding of knowing
and purposeful conduct on the part of the employer.”33 He
further asserted that the term “suggesting” was too vague to
provide employers with proper notice. 34 Christie also argued
that the penalties were too strong and that the bill was unclear
as to whether a private civil cause of action had been created. 35
Finally, Christie noted that the “bill’s provisions likely conflict
with existing civil service laws, rules and regulations and may
subject appointing authorities to the penalties set forth in the
legislation.”36
In less than two months, the New Jersey state legislature
addressed Christie’s concerns and passed the final bill, which
provides:
Unless otherwise permitted by the provisions of
Title 11A of the New Jersey Statutes or any
other law, rule or regulation, no employer or
employer’s agent, representative, or designee
shall knowingly or purposefully publish, in print
or on the Internet, an advertisement for any job
vacancy in this State that contains one or more of
the following:
a. Any

provision

stating

that

the

31. Id.
32. Veto Message from Chris Christie, Governor of N.J., to The Members
of
the
N.J.
General
Assembly,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/A3500/3359_V1.PDF (last visited Apr.
15, 2013).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id.
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qualifications for a job include current
employment;
b. Any provision stating that the employer
or employer’s agent, representative, or
designee will not consider or review an
application for employment submitted by
any job applicant currently unemployed;
or
c. Any provision stating that the employer
or employer’s agent, representative, or
designee will only consider or review
applications for employment submitted by
job applicants who are currently
employed.
Nothing set forth in this section shall be
construed as prohibiting an employer or
employer’s agent, representative, or designee
from publishing, in print or on the Internet, an
advertisement for any job vacancy in this State
that contains any provision setting forth any
other qualifications for a job, as permitted by
law, including, but not limited to, the holding of
a current and valid professional or occupational
license, certificate, registration, permit or other
credential, or a minimum level of education,
training or professional, occupational or field
experience.
In addition, nothing set forth in this section shall
be construed as prohibiting an employer or
employer’s agent, representative, or designee
from publishing, in print or on the Internet, an
advertisement for any job vacancy that contains
any provision stating that only applicants who

9
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are currently employed by such employer will be
considered.37
The legislation included maximum civil penalties of $1,000 for
the first violation, $5,000 for the second violation, and $10,000
for each subsequent violation.38 The legislation explicitly
disclaims that it creates a private right of action.39
Ultimately, the final version of the legislation appears to
have followed a middle path. The law prohibits employers from
posting job advertisements that exclude currently unemployed
candidates.40 However, it does not ban consideration of either
past or present employment statuses in hiring decisions.41 Also,
it subjects violators to civil fines. 42 These fines are graduated
penalties, with the severity rising with recidivism.43 Finally,
the passed legislation does not create a private right of action,
leaving it to the state to enforce the provisions.44
b. Washington, District of Columbia
On March 19, 2012, the Mayor of the District of Columbia
signed a proposed law making it unlawful for an employer to
refuse to hire or consider for hire a candidate based on his or
her employment status.45 This legislation also specifically
prohibits employers from publishing an advertisement for a job
opening that disqualifies candidates who are not presently

37. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-1 (West 2011).
38. Id. § 34:8B-2.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 34:8B-1.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 34:8B-2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. D.C. CODE § 32-1361 (2012); see also Katharine H. Parker & Daniel
L. Saperstein, Client Alert, Law Prohibiting Discrimination Based on
Unemployment Status Signed by DC Mayor: Employers Beware – Similar
Laws
Likely
to
Follow,
PROSKAUER
(Mar.
28,
2012),
http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/law-prohibitingdiscrimination-based-on-unemployment-status/.
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employed.46 The law further protects whistleblowers,
prohibiting employers from restraining current employees’
exercise of rights conferred by the act or from retaliating
against employees who take action under the act.47 Despite
implementing broad protections for the unemployed, the law
permits employers to (1) post job advertisements that require
occupational or professional licenses or other similar
qualifications, (2) consider the reasons underlying a candidate’s
unemployment, and (3) publish job advertisements that state
only the employer’s current employees will be considered.48 No
private right of action is created.49 Instead, aggrieved
individuals must file claims with the District of Columbia’s
Office of Human Rights, which must investigate all claims and
assess civil penalties against employers determined to have
violated the act.50 The civil fines are as follows: $1,000 per
claimant for an initial violation, $5,000 per claimant for a
second violation, and $10,000 per claimant for each subsequent
violation, not to exceed a total of $20,000 per violation.51
Currently, the District of Columbia stands alone in
prohibiting employers from considering a candidate’s
employment status in the ultimate hiring decision. However, as
noted below, the federal proposals are very similar.
c. Oregon
On March 27, 2012, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber
signed into law an act that prohibits discrimination against the
unemployed in job listings.52 The Oregon law was passed
within two months of its introduction in the state senate.53 The
Oregon statute is similar to that of New Jersey’s in virtually all

46. D.C. CODE § 32-1362(2).
47. Id. § 32-1363.
48. Id. § 32-1364.
49. Id. § 32-1366(b).
50. Id. § 32-1365.
51. Id. § 32-1366(a).
52. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 85.2 (West 2012); S. 1548, 76th Leg. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2012).
53. See Or. S. 1548.
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material respects, except that the Oregon statute caps the
penalties at $1,000.54 This means that the Oregon statute only
prohibits employers from the following: publishing job
advertisements that indicate that currently unemployed
candidates should not apply for the job, or stating that such
individuals will not be considered for the position.55 However,
the law does not bar the consideration of employment status in
the ultimate hiring decision.56 Additionally, there is no private
right of action.57
d. California
The California legislature passed Assembly Bill 1450 on
August 30, 2012, enrolling the bill for Governor Jerry Brown’s
approval on September 11, 2012.58 The version of the bill that
passed both the state assembly and senate hews closely to the
model of New Jersey and Oregon.59 The California legislation,
however, has a few unique aspects to it. First, in addition to
applying to employers and employment agencies, it also
prohibits operators of internet web sites from publishing
advertisements that exclude currently unemployed candidates,
unless such advertisement is based on a bona fide occupational
qualification or are restricted to current employees of the
employer.60 Second, state contractors who violate the statute
may have their contracts cancelled and may be barred from
seeking other state contracts for up to three years.61
The most interesting thing about the California legislation
is that its scope was much broader when it was originally
introduced in January 2012. First, it defined “status as
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

§ 85.2(4); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.855(1) (West 2011).
§ 85.2(1).
§ 85.2.
§ 85.2(3).
Assembly Bill No. 1450, Version: 9/11/12 – Enrolled, CAL.
LEGISLATIVE
INFO.,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120
AB1450 (last visited April 1, 2013).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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unemployed”
as
including
an
individual’s
past
62
unemployment.
Second, in addition to the publication
provisions that ultimately passed, the proposed legislation
would have prohibited employers from refusing to consider
candidates based on their status as unemployed and it would
have made it unlawful for employment agencies to refuse to
refer somebody on the same basis.63 Third, the proposed
legislation included whistleblower protections.64 The California
Senate cut these provisions through its amendments.65 The bill
was then passed after its third reading.66 However, on
September 30, 2012, Governor Brown returned the bill without
his signature, stating without explanation that the changes
could lead to unnecessary confusion.67
e. Pending State Legislation
In Arizona, House Bill 2660 was introduced on January 25,
2012 but it has been held in committees since then.68 The
proposed bill would treat long-term unemployment status
(defined as twenty-seven or more continuous weeks of
unemployment) like race, color, religion, sex, age, national
origin, or disability, prohibiting employers and employment
agencies from using long-term unemployment status as a basis
for hiring and other employment decisions.69 Similar bills in
Illinois70 and Maryland71 are pending in committees, while an

62. See id. at Version: 01/05/12 - Introduced.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at Version: 8/22/12 – Amended Senate Introduced.
66. See id. at Version: 9/11/12 – Enrolled..
67. Veto Message from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of Cal., to The
Members of the California State Assembly (Sept. 30, 2012), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/docs/AB_1450_Veto_Message.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
68. See H.R. 2660, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012); see also Bill
Overview
Status:HB2660,
ARIZ.
STATE
LEGISLATURE,
http://www.azleg.gov//FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/50leg/2r/bills/hb2
660o.asp&Session_ID=107 (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
69. Ariz. H.R. 2660.
70. See S. 2153, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011).
71. See S. 966, 430th Gen. Assemb., (Md. 2012).
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analogous proposal failed in the Wisconsin Senate.72
In Connecticut, the general assembly introduced Bill No.
5199, which would prohibit employers both from posting job
advertisements that excluded unemployed candidates and from
refusing to hire an individual based on their current and recent
employment status, unless it was a bona fide occupational
qualification.73 The bill appears to have failed.74 Similar
proposals in New York and Pennsylvania are still pending
while proposed bills in Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota,
South Dakota, and Tennessee have been stalled or killed in
committees.75
In New Hampshire, House Bill 350 was introduced on
January 3, 2013 and is now in committee.76 This proposed bill
72. See generally Senate Bill 249, WIS. LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS,
http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/proposals/reg/sen/bill/sb249 (last visited
Apr. 13, 2013).
73. H.R.
5199,
Gen.
Assemb.,
Feb.
Sess.
(Conn.
2012),
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/TOB/h/pdf/2012HB-05199-R00-HB.pdf.
74. See Discrimination Against the Unemployed, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Oct.
15,
2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/labor/discrimination-against-the-unemployed.aspx.
75. See
H.R.
815,
114th
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Fla.
2012),
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=48051&
(died in Bus. & Affairs Subcomm., Mar. 9, 2012); S. 205, 117th Gen. Assemb.,
2d
Reg.
Sess.
(Ind.
2012),
http://www.in.gov/apps/lsa/session/billwatch/billinfo?year=2012&session=1&r
equest=getBill&docno=205 (in Comm., Jan. 4, 2012); S. 2028, Gen. Assemb.
(Iowa
2012),
http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/CoolICE/default.asp?Category=BillInfo&Service=DspHistory&var=SF&key=0617
B&GA=84 (Subcomm. reassignment, Feb. 15, 2012); S. 1919, 87th Leg.
(Minn.
2012),
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/revisor/pages/search_status/status_detail.php?b=
Senate&f=SF1919&ssn=0&y=2012 (referring bill to Judiciary & Public
Safety, Feb. 16, 2012); S. 00677, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013),
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?term=2013&bn=S00677 (reintroducing bill,
Jan. 9, 2013); H.R. 180, Gen. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013),
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2013&sind=0&
body=H&type=B&bn=0180 (reintroducing prior H.R. 2157 of 2011/2012, Jan.
22, 2013); S. 184, Leg. Assemb., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012),
http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2012/QuickFind.aspx (deferring bill, Feb. 10,
2012);
S.
3130,
Gen.
Assemb.
(Tenn.
2012),
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=HB3757&g
a=107 (deferring bill, Mar. 14, 2012).
76. See
H.R.
350,
163rd
Gen.
Ct.
(N.H.
2013),
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/Bill_docket.aspx?lsr=466&sy=201
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would prohibit employers and employment agencies from
discriminating against unemployed individuals in hiring
decisions and advertisements.77 Violations would result in a
fine of no more than $5,000 for the first violation and $10,000
for subsequent violations.78 However, unlike Connecticut’s
proposed bill described in the paragraph above, New
Hampshire’s proposed bill does not include an explicit
exception for bona fide occupational qualifications.79
In Colorado, House Bill 12-1134 was introduced on
January 20, 2012.80 In substance, it is very similar to the
legislation passed by New Jersey, calling for the same
penalties, substantive scope, and absence of a private right of
action.81 On February 21, 2012, the Colorado House Committee
on Economic and Business Development recommended that the
bill be postponed indefinitely.82 Similar legislation proposed in
Michigan and Ohio is still pending.83
f. Local Responses
Even municipal legislators have dabbled in legislation
designed to prevent employers from discriminating against
unemployed candidates. Notably, as of May 1, 2012, a Chicago
3&sortoption=billnumber&txtsessionyear=2013&txtbillnumber=hb350
(introducing bill, Jan. 3, 2013).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See H.R. 12-1134, 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2012),
http://www.statebillinfo.com/bills/bills/12/1134_01.pdf (introducing bill, Jan.
20, 2012).
81. Id.
82. Reference Report, COLO. COMM. ON EDUC., HOUSE COMM. OF
REFERENCE
REP.,
Feb.
27,
2012,
available
at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2012a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/5F41EDDF50393
15E87257981007E0034?Open&file=HB1135_C_001.pdf (last visited Sept. 30,
2012).
83. See H.R. 4675, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011),
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(sqjzm5uu34nscm45y2roco55))/mileg.aspx?pa
ge=GetObject&objectName=2011-HB-4675 (introducing bill, May 24, 2011);
H.R.
424,
129th
Gen.
Assemb.
(Ohio
2012),
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_424_I_Y.pdf
(introducing bill, Jan. 24, 2012).
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city ordinance prohibits employers from publishing job
advertisements that discriminate against the currently
unemployed.84 Also, on January 23, 2013, the City Council of
New York City passed a bill that would make it unlawful for
employers to base employment decisions on a candidate’s
recent or current unemployment and to publish job
advertisements that discriminate against the unemployed.85
Mayor Bloomberg of New York has stated that he will veto the
bill but the city council likely has enough votes to override the
veto.86
2.

Federal Response
a. Initial Response from Congress and EEOC

In response to the early news stories of employers
discriminating against unemployed candidates, in November
2010, more than fifty members of Congress wrote to the
chairperson of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), voicing their outrage and calling on the
agency to investigate how the practice of excluding unemployed
individuals from consideration for job opportunities might have
an adverse impact on minority groups.87 The members of
Congress further asserted that if employers discriminated
against the unemployed, it would prolong the unemployment
crisis.88
On February 16, 2011, the EEOC met to examine the
treatment of unemployed job seekers.89 The EEOC heard from
eight panelists who came from the U.S. Department of Labor,
84. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2-160-055 (2012).
85. NYC Council Passes Bill Protecting Unemployed, THE LEADER, Jan.
24, 2013, at 3A, available at 2013 WLNR 1859522.
86. Id.
87. Letter from Representative Hank Johnson, et al., to Jacqueline
Berrien, Chair, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Nov. 17,
2010), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/d46e3430d5e9cd7003_2tm6vw2oy.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Meeting of Feb. 16, 2011— EEOC to Examine Treatment of
Unemployed Job Seekers, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-1611/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
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non-profit organizations, and private firms.90 The panelists
discussed whether employers actually discriminated against
the unemployed, the effect any such discrimination might have
on different populations, and the issues associated with
bringing Title VII disparate impact claims based on the
practice. 91
b. Congressional Legislative Proposals
While the EEOC has not yet formally acted on its hearing,
members of Congress have introduced several bills that would
prohibit unemployment discrimination.
On March 26, 2011, Representative Hank Johnson from
Georgia introduced H.R. 1113, the Fair Employment Act of
2011.92 This bill would amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-1, et seq.) by adding “unemployment status” to
the list of covered characteristics.93 The bill remains in
committee.94
On September 21, 2011, Representative John Larson from
Connecticut introduced the American Jobs Act of 2011.95 This
bill included a section that would prohibit discrimination in
employment on the basis of an individual’s employment status
and is very similar to the legislation passed in the District of
Columbia.96 The federal bill would prohibit employers from
publishing job advertisements that excluded candidates who
were currently unemployed and from refusing to hire or
consider hiring an individual based on his or her current
employment status.97 The bill also contained a whistleblower
provision that would prevent employers from restraining

90. Transcript of U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Meeting,
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-1611/transcript.cfm [hereinafter Transcript of EEOC Meeting].
91. Id.
92. Fair Employment Act of 2011, H.R. 1113, 112th Cong. (2011).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. American Jobs Act of 2011, H.R. 12, 112th Cong. (2011).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 374(a)-(b).
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individuals from exercising their rights under the act or from
retaliating against individuals for exercising those rights.98 The
proposed bill would not have precluded an employer or
employment agency from considering an individual’s
employment history.99 The bill provided for a private right of
action.100 Remedies included injunctive relief, reimbursement
of costs, liquidated damages of no more than $1,000 for each
day of the violation, attorneys’ fees, and compensatory damages
not to exceed $5,000.101 The bill failed in the Senate.102 Two
other bills – S. 1549 and H.R. 3638 – set forth similar
proposals.103 These bills remain in committee.104
Additionally, on July 12, 2012, Representative Rosa
DeLauro from Connecticut introduced H.R. 2501.105 Further, on
August 2, 2011, Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut
introduced S. 1471.106 These proposals are very similar to the
American Jobs Act provisions described above. The key
difference is that H.R. 2501 and S. 1471 prohibit employers
from discriminating against candidates based on the
candidate’s history of unemployment as well as the candidate’s
current employment status.107 The bills remain in committee.108

98. Id. § 374(c).
99. Id. § 374(d).
100. Id. § 375(a)(6).
101. Id. § 375(c).
102. See Alan Silverleib, Obama Vows to Break Jobs Plan Into Separate
Bills After Senate Setback, CNN (Oct. 12, 2011, 12:09 PM),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-11/politics/politics_jobs-bill_1_jobs-plan-gopleaders-senate-democrats?_s=PM:POLITICS; Daniel L. Saperstein, The
Hiring Process Redefined: How Employers Should Prepare for the Prospect of
“Unemployment Discrimination” Laws, 18 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRACTICAL
GUIDANCE 1, art. 3 (2012).
103. Act for the 99%, H.R. 3638, 112th Cong. (2011); American Jobs Act
of 2011, S. 1549, 112th Cong. (2011).
104. H.R. 3638; S.1549.
105. Fair Employment Opportunity Act of 2011, H.R. 2501, 112th Cong.
(2011).
106. Fair Employment Opportunity Act of 2011, S. 1471, 112th Cong.
(2011).
107. See H.R. 2501; S. 1471.
108. H.R. 2501; S. 1471.
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III. Discussion
A. Solutions in Search of a Problem?
One of the most curious aspects of the flurry of legislative
activity detailed above is that it appears to be based on very
little evidence that discrimination against the unemployed is
actually a widespread practice. A dozen or so articles detailed a
handful of cases and included reports of recruiters
acknowledging the existence of the practice even when not
explicitly stated.109 And, as seen in the legislative records,
these stories generally have formed the basis for the proposed
legislation.110
But only one survey has been conducted and publicized. In
2011, the National Employment Law Project (NELP) found
more than 150 job postings on employment web sites such as
Indeed.com, CareerBuilder.com, and Monster.com requiring
that applicants “must be currently employed” or using other
exclusionary language based on current employment status.111
Michael Saltsman, a research fellow at the Employment
Policies Institute, took issue with the NELP report.112
Saltsman observed that one of the websites examined by NELP
estimated that there were three million job posts available
online when NELP searched its site.113 This means that the
incidence rate of job postings that discriminated against the
109. See Jobs Hiring Bias Hurts Seekers' Chances Those Who are
Unemployed for Lengthy Time See Discrimination, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 26,
2012, at B6; The Long-Jobless See Hiring Bias, L.A. TIMES, Mar, 24, 2012, at
4; Stephen Singer, No Jobs? That May Keep You from Getting One, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 24, 2012, at A13, available at 2012 WLNR 6459742;
Mary Helen Miller, Help Wanted. But Only if You Have a Job, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 8, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 17839308.
110. See, e.g., Letter from Representative Hank Johnson, et al., to
Jacqueline Berrien, supra note 87; Paul Moriarty, The Unemployed: ‘Elitist’
Republican Stands in the Way, DAILY REC., Nov. 7, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 22252689.
111. Sam Hananel, Jobless Seek Protection Against Bias, CHI. SUNTIMES, Oct. 10, 2011, at 37.
112. See Michael Saltsman, Are the Unemployed Victims of
Discrimination?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2011, at A15.
113. Id.
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unemployed was less than 0.005% of one month’s job
postings.114 Saltsman further contended that the NELP report
took words out of context, citing an example in which the
phrase “currently employed” appeared but did not indicate that
the unemployed were unwelcome to apply.115 Saltsman
concluded that, given the lack of hard data as to whether
employers are discriminating against the unemployed, the
legislative activity is misguided, as it would create a new
liability for employers while doing little to lower the
unemployment rate.116
It is also possible that employers are reducing their use of
employment status in hiring given the public’s response to the
practice. For example, as noted above, Sony Erickson—whose
2010 advertisement kicked off the public debate—quickly
disclaimed any responsibility for the inclusion of the currentemployment requirement in the posting.117 Additionally, in
September 2011, the job listing website Indeed.com said that it
would stop posting advertisements that exclude applications
from unemployed candidates.118 Accordingly, there are several
data points that suggest employers might be moving away from
excluding unemployed candidates even absent legislation.
As exemplified by the testimony of the various panelists at
the EEOC hearing to examine the practice of excluding
currently unemployed people from an applicant pool, there are
other general trends and perspectives that might color whether
one believes that unemployment discrimination is widespread.
At the EEOC hearing, William E. Spriggs, Assistant Secretary
for Policy, U.S. Department of Labor, was the first to testify.119
He noted that there were approximately nine unemployed job
seekers for every two available positions and that, given the
surplus in labor supply, “employers, of course, are going to very

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Stratton, supra note 13, at B1.
118. Job Website Will Refuse Ads that Reject Unemployed, TAMPA BAY
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at 4B.
119. Transcript of EEOC Meeting, supra note 90.
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likely up the ante on job applicants.”120 He specifically
referenced the possibility that employers might require
applicants to be currently employed or only very recently
unemployed and observed that it is hard to quantify the
prevalence of the practice because it might not be done
openly.121 Christine Owens, Executive Director of the National
Employment Law Project (NELP), echoed these views,
describing anecdotal reports of the discriminatory practices
and the disparate impact it has had on older workers, women,
and minorities.122 On the other hand, Fernan R. Cepero, Vice
President for Human Resources of The YMCA of Greater
Rochester, representing the Society for Human Resource
Management, discussed the costs involved in hiring, explaining
that the key issue for employers is getting the right employee
as opposed to privileging an artificial marker such as current
employment status.123 He further stated that his organization
is unaware of any trend in excluding the unemployed from
consideration for jobs.124 James S. Urban, a partner at Jones
Day, seconded Cepero’s remarks and described looking through
“help wanted” sections of major newspapers and not turning up
any advertisements that excluded the unemployed.125
Although there is a paucity of data supporting the notion
that discrimination against the unemployed is a widespread
practice, as discussed further below, the legislative activity
might have some beneficial economic effects and expresses
social values. The legislative activity will likely aid members of
constitutionally-protected classes who are unemployed and
disproportionately impacted by the practice, and will not result
in the parade of horribles described by employer-friendly
industry groups.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

21

1028

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

B. Anti-Unemployment Discrimination Legislation as a Means
of Reducing Unemployment or Otherwise Improving the
Economy
The public rhetoric in support of the anti-unemployment
discrimination legislation often includes strong words about
how discrimination against the unemployed prolongs
joblessness and hurts the economy. For example, at a press
conference promoting the proposed Fair Employment
Opportunity Act in September 2011, Senator Sherrod Brown
said: “The best way to get our economy back on track is also the
best way to reduce our deficit: putting people back to work.
There are millions of Americans who would rather be paying
taxes than collecting unemployment insurance.”126 In an article
attacking opponents of New Jersey’s anti-unemployment
discrimination legislation, a New Jersey assemblyman stated:
“It is also now apparent that when our state’s Republican
leaders talk about creating jobs for New Jersey residents, those
jobs aren’t necessarily for the jobless.”127 A state senator,
supporting the passage of the Oregon bill, asserted: “It’s crazy
to say that you have to have work, to look for work. If you had
work, you wouldn’t need work, so you wouldn’t have to look for
work. We’re just trying to make it clear that people who don’t
have work can look for work.”128
While this rhetoric speaks to a sense of injustice and lack
of fairness, it does not actually explain the mechanics of how
the bills might reduce unemployment. Illustrating this gap, the
California Assembly’s Committee on Judiciary issued a report
in which it asked whether employers’ policies discriminating

126. Press Release, Sherrod Brown, Senator for Ohio, Unemployed
Ohioans Need Not Apply: Brown Calls for Swift Passage of Bill Outlawing
Discrimination Against Jobless Americans (Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-joinsunemployed-worker-in-columbus-to-call-for-swift-passage-of-bill-outlawingdiscrimination-against-the-unemployed.
127. Moriarty, supra note 110.
128. Janie Har, Employers Could Not Discriminate Against the
Unemployed Under Bill: 2012 Oregon Legislature, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Feb. 22, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 3875033.
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against the unemployed exacerbate the unemployment crisis.129
The supporters of the bill argued that such policies “reflect
insensitivity to today’s sever job deficit” and that “the lack of
available job openings and the denial of employment
opportunities that do exist create stark obstacles for more than
14 million unemployed who simply want to get back to
work.”130 The problem with this statement is that addressing
putative barriers for unemployed candidates does not clearly
mitigate the issue of overwhelming job scarcity, which
presumably drives the high unemployment rates and the
negative economic effects of high unemployment.
To this point, writing in opposition to California’s antiunemployment discrimination bill, a coalition of employer
groups lead by the California Chamber of Commerce explained,
“Finally, this bill will not affect the unemployment rate. If
there is an available position, the employer will ultimately hire
someone.”131 Additionally, as an Oregon representative
observed, “There’s nothing I can perceive in this piece of
legislation that would create one more job in the private
sector.”132
As the opponents of the anti-unemployment discrimination
bills argue, the salutary effect of the bills probably will not be a
reduction in aggregate unemployment. Even if we assume that
most employers have a preference for hiring currently
employed individuals, in the aggregate, employer-demand for a
new full-time employee presumably ultimately results in the
hiring of a currently unemployed individual. When an
employer excludes the currently unemployed from its applicant
pool, it does so in the belief that it can entice a currently
employed individual to leave his or her job for the new position.
If this belief is correct, the new hire’s old position presumably

129. See Bill Analysis: Discrimination on the Basis of Unemployment,
CAL. ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM., Apr. 17, 2012,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_14011450/ab_1450_cfa_20120416_105620_asm_comm.html.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Id. at 9.
132. Editorial, Employment Discrimination Always Wrong, WALLA
WALLA UNION-BULL., Feb. 29, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 4410359.
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is now open and must be filled. Eventually, some employer will
have to either opt to let its position remain vacant and suffer
the associated economic costs or hire a currently unemployed
individual. In other words, it is job creation that reduces
unemployment and the anti-unemployment discrimination bills
do not obviously encourage job creation.133 To the contrary, it is
possible that some employers might actually forgo seeking to
fill positions based on liability concerns related to the antiunemployment discrimination legislation.134
On the other hand, the anti-unemployment discrimination
legislation probably has economic benefits other than reducing
unemployment in the aggregate. First, it is widely
acknowledged that arbitrary discrimination negatively impacts
the economy. As a senator stated when discussing Title VII,
“There is considerable evidence to demonstrate that permitting
people to be hired on the basis of their qualifications not only
helps business, but also improves the total national
economy.”135 Amongst other harms, discriminatory exclusions
in hiring can alienate clients and artificially limit applicant
pools.136
Second, although the anti-unemployment discrimination
legislation is unlikely to reduce the aggregate amount of
unemployment, it might lead to an economically healthier
distribution and pattern of unemployment. By reducing
barriers for unemployed candidates, the anti-unemployment
133. See generally Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, The Supreme Court 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 37 (1976) (arguing that there is a cost to innocent individuals in the
employment context that results from remedying racial discrimination
because even the usual specific remedy—an order requiring the employer to
accord an identifiable individual priority for the next vacancy—adversely
affects another applicant for the vacancy who would otherwise have gotten
the job).
134. See, e.g., Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Sorting, Quotas, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Who Hires When It's Hard To Fire?, 45 J.L. & ECON. 41,
43 (2002) (noting that higher expected costs of litigation by protected workers
might work to reduce the number of protected workers employed).
135. 110 CONG. REC. 13,088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
136. See Vivek Wadhwa, The True Cost of Discrimination, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 5, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-0605/the-true-cost-of-discrimination; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 351-52 (1981).
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discrimination legislation might encourage greater job
movement
amongst
currently
employed
individuals,
encouraging those who are dissatisfied with their jobs to quit
because they will be more optimistic about finding another
position.137 And, with more positions in play and no exclusions
for unemployed candidates, there might be less stasis amongst
the long-term unemployed. The economy would likely benefit
from this lessened degree of stasis, because long-term
unemployment carries unique problems that are more severe
than those associated with brief periods of unemployment. For
example, after a long time out of the workforce, workers’ skills
might decay.138 This is particularly true for positions in which
there are rapid changes in technology.139 Additionally, longterm unemployment can damage a family’s finances as savings
are depleted.140 This, in turn, might place a greater burden on
government programs such as Medicaid.141 It also might hurt
the economy as a whole because the decline in consumer
spending might impede growth.142 Workers’ morale might

137. Robert E. Hall, Turnover in the Labor Force, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS
ECON.
ACTIVITY
709,
712
(1972),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/1972%203/1972c_bpea_hall
_gordon_holt.PDF (“[Workers’] decisions to quit will depend on the amount of
the loss involved and the cost of finding new work. Everything else held
constant, slack markets should discourage quits.”); Paula G. Ardelean et al.,
The Development of Employment Rights and Responsibilities from 1985 to
2010, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 457 (2010) (“As fewer positions are
available, employers become less willing to take chances in hiring, and
employees become less willing to risk losing a secure position.”).
138. In the Bleak Midwinter: Poverty Looms for the Long-Term
Unemployed,
ECONOMIST
(Dec.
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.economist.com/node/17733387?subjectid=348876&story_id=17733
387 [hereinafter In the Bleak Midwinter]; Megan Felter, Short-Time
Compensation: Is Germany’s Success with Kurzarbeit an Answer to U.S.
Unemployment?, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 481, 493-94 (2012) (detailing
benefits of avoiding long-term unemployment for employers, employees, and
government).
139. Katherine Yung, Long-Term Unemployed Face Spiral Downward,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 4, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 17502459.
140. Id.
141. Id.; see also In the Bleak Midwinter, supra note 138.
142. Patrik Jonsson, Why Have Millions of Americans Given Up Looking
for Work?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 8, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR
19157620.
ON
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suffer too, leading to fewer motivated job seekers and a rise in
health and emotional problems.143
Although long-term unemployment is not singled out as
the target of the legislation, these sentiments have been
captured in the legislative records of several proposed antiunemployment discrimination bills.144 For example, the most
recently introduced federal bill states that discrimination
against the unemployed burdens commerce by:
(1)
reducing personal consumption and
undermining economic stability and growth;
(2) squandering human capital essential to the
Nation’s economic vibrancy and growth;
(3) increasing demands for Federal and State
unemployment insurance benefits, reducing trust
fund assets, and leading to higher payroll taxes
for employers, cuts in benefits for jobless
workers, or both;
(4) imposing additional burdens on publicly
funded health and welfare programs; and
(5) depressing income, property, and other tax
revenues that the Federal Government, States,
and localities rely on to support operations and
institutions essential to commerce.145
Despite the general thrust of public rhetoric in support of
the anti-unemployment discrimination bill, they are unlikely to
reduce unemployment in the aggregate but they might change
the demographics of the unemployed in a manner that benefits
the economy.
C. Anti-Unemployment Discrimination Bills as an Expression
of Social Values

143. Id.; Tara Siegel Bernard, When 'for Richer, for Poorer' is Put to the
Test, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2012 at B1; Yung, supra note 139, at A1.
144. See S. 1471, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 2028, 84th Gen. Assemb. Sess.
(Iowa 2012); S. 3130, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012).
145. S. 1471.
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Laws communicate a society’s values.146 People may
support a law because they “believe that [the law] is
intrinsically valuable for the relevant ‘statement’ to be made”
and not because of the law’s ability to control behavior.”147
Given the unclear economic benefit of anti-unemployment
discrimination bills, it is easiest to characterize them as
expressions of social values.
First, the bills express society’s understanding of fairness.
As noted above, in June 2011, in a national survey conducted
by Hart Research Associates, eighty percent of respondents
described employers’ refusal to consider unemployed job
applicants as “very unfair.”148 Indeed, the public rhetoric
surrounding the bills mirrors this. For example, Senator Brown
promoted the proposed Fair Employment Opportunity Act of
2012 by stating, “Americans who work hard and play by the
rules— but lose a job through no fault of their own—deserve a
fair chance at the next one.”149 And, as Helen Norton, a
professor at the University of Colorado Law School, testified
before the EEOC, current employment is likely a weak proxy
for former professional success or relevant experience.150
Second, the bills express a sense of care for the sensibilities
of the unemployed. For example, following the initial passage
of the New Jersey bill in the state assembly, Democrat
Assemblyman Paul Moriarty wrote a piece that unfavorably
compared Assemblyman Jay Webber, one of New Jersey’s
highest-ranking Republicans, unfavorably to “heartless elitists”
after Webber voted against the bill.151 Moriarty explained that
employers who run job advertisements that exclude
unemployed candidates “make unemployed people feel like
146. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021, 2022 (1996).
147. Id. at 2026.
148. Briefing Paper, Hiring Discrimination Against the Unemployed:
Federal Bill Outlaws Excluding the Unemployed from Job Opportunities, as
Discriminatory Ads Persist, NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT 3 (July 12,
2011), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/b4ade339e970088d72_alm6blqx8.pdf.
149. CONG. DOCS. (Sept. 21, 2011), available at 2011 WLNR 18890284.
150. Transcript of EEOC Meeting, supra note 90.
151. See Moriarty, supra note 110.
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lepers, outcasts and losers.”152 and communicated that, “You’re
damaged goods, you don’t merit consideration, jobs are not for
the jobless, just for those already employed!”153 He argued that
preventing this message was more important than protecting
businesses from additional regulation.
D. Anti-Unemployment Discrimination Bills as Protection for
Members of Constitutionally-Protected Classes
Employment status, in and of itself, is not immutable and,
therefore, does not fit comfortably within the set of existing
constitutionally-protected classes.154 This might explain why
the legislative attempts to turn employment status into a
protected class have been less successful than enacting
narrower anti-unemployment discrimination bills.155 But the
concern that discrimination against unemployed candidates
might disproportionately impact minorities, seniors, women,
and the disabled appears to have driven the initial federal
activity. For example, the November 2010 letter from more
than fifty member of Congress to the chairperson of the EEOC
explicitly identified the worry that excluding unemployed
individuals from consideration for job opportunities might have
an adverse impact on minority groups.156 As such, the
panelists’ discussions at the February 2011 EEOC meeting

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health
Promotion: The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks
and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 320 (2010) (“A key difference between antidiscrimination laws and common law doctrine is that the former creates
protected classes defined primarily (although not exclusively—religion is an
exception) on immutable traits of the employee, like race, age, and genetics,
while common law doctrine focuses on the employer's reasons or the
employee's actions, without regard to such inherent traits.”).
155. Compare N. J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-1 (West 2011) (New Jersey
statute regarding restrictions upon the use of employment status as a
qualification for job vacancies), with H.R. 2660, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2012) (Arizona employment discrimination bill).
156. See Letter from Representative Hank Johnson, et al., to Jacqueline
Berrien, supra note 87, at 1.
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focused on this issue.157
At the EEOC hearing, Assistant Secretary Spriggs
observed that African Americans, Latinos, and workers with
disabilities were overrepresented in the unemployment pool.158
He further explained that older workers make up a
disproportionate share of the long-term unemployed.159 He
concluded “there is the strong indication that there’s the
potential for disparate impacts among racial minorities, among
workers with disabilities, and among older workers.”160
Christine Owens, Executive Director of NELP, also described
anecdotal reports of the discriminatory practices and the
disparate impact they likely have had on older workers,
women, and minorities.161 Fatima Goss Graves, Vice President
for Education and Employment at the National Women’s Law
Center, testified that the practice would likely have a disparate
impact on women, noting that women have lost ground to men
in employment rates during the recession and that women are
more likely to be long-term unemployed.162 Algernon Austin,
Director of the Race, Ethnicity, and the Economy Program at
the Economic Policy Institute, asserted that the practice would
have a disparate impact on racial minorities, focusing on their
current and historical high rates of unemployment, when
compared to whites.163 Joyce Bender, CEO of Bender
Consulting Services, likewise discussed why the practice would
have a disparate impact on the disabled, explaining that many
individuals become disabled after an accident that leaves them
without a current job. 164 The testimony of Assistant Secretary
Spriggs, and the rest of the speakers, is consistent with the
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is
described above.
On the other hand, Mr. Urban, a partner at Jones Day,

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See Transcript of EEOC Meeting, supra note 90.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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argued that the numbers from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistic did not meet the EEOC’s threshold for showing a
disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic job
seekers.165 But Professor Norton countered that the
demographic data offered by the other witnesses suggested
that a current-employment requirement had the potential to
impose an adverse impact in a number of contexts.166 She noted
that the particular market and job would play a role in
determining whether the allegedly discriminatory policy had a
disparate impact.167 Also, Mr. Urban’s comments only go to
whether a complainant would be able to allege a prima facie
Title VII disparate impact claim; not whether members of
constitutionally-protected classes are, as a matter of fact,
disproportionately vulnerable to current-employment hiring
policies.
Regardless as to whether Mr. Urban or Professor Norton is
right about whether a member of a racial minority group could
demonstrate that a particular practice has a legally cognizable
disparate impact, the anti-unemployment discrimination bills
have value precisely because a Title VII challenge to a currentemployment requirement would be difficult. More generally,
the anti-unemployment discrimination bills arguably are
necessary preventative measures to cover gaps or weak spots in
existing anti-discrimination statutes.
The prophylactic value of the bills is even more pronounced
when considering the effect of a current-employment
requirement on older individuals. Actions, otherwise prohibited
by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act168 (“ADEA”), are
not unlawful if the differentiation made by the employer “is
based on reasonable factors other than age.”169 This is a
defense unique to the ADEA, making liability under an ADEA
adverse impact theory narrower than under Title VII, and
mixed-motives are permissible in the ADEA context.170 In
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4

Id.
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012).
Id. § 623 (f)(1).
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009);
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effect, the broader anti-unemployment discrimination bills
(such as that passed by the District of Columbia) remove
employment status from the set of reasonable factors that
would otherwise permit an employer to differentiate between
younger and older candidates. (Whether employment status
ever is a bona fide qualification or a proxy for legitimate
qualifications is discussed further in the next section.)
E. Business Community’s Concerns About Legislation Are
Likely Overstated
In opposition to the anti-unemployment discrimination
bills, the business community has marshaled several
arguments, which focus on the potential harms. In particular,
pro-employer commentators have questioned whether the bills
will (1) open the floodgate of potentially frivolous litigation and
(2) reduce employers’ ability to properly vet applicants.171
These concerns appear overstated given the generally limited
scope of the legislation, the lack of a private right of action, and
legally approved uses of employment status and history.
1.

Concern that Legislation Will Open Floodgate of
Litigation

The pro-employer faction, typified by the large law firms
that do labor law defense work, has suggested whether the
anti-unemployment discrimination bills will lead to a
significant increase in litigation. For example, an associate at
Proskauer Rose contends that the definition of unemployment
status in some proposals is so broad that it could apply to just
about any query regarding the candidate’s work history.172 He
also notes that some of the proposals allow for a private right of
action with regard to the restrictions on including exclusionary
Smith v. City of Jackson, Inc., 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
171. See Saperstein, supra note 102; Cal. Senate Rules Committee,
Office of Senate Floor Analyses, Aug. 22, 2012; Lawrence R. Sandak & Daniel
L. Saperstein, Is N.J. Going Too Far to Protect Jobless?, STAR-LEDGER, Apr.
30, 2012, at 5, available at 2012 WLNR 9079300.
172. See Saperstein, supra note 102.
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language in job advertisements.173 He argues that, under these
proposals, it is possible for any currently unemployed
individual to identify a non-complying job posting, inquire
about the position, and, if refused employment, file a lawsuit.174
He further asserts that such proposals unduly encourage
litigation.175 He also raises the specter of negligent-hiring
claims, reasoning that, for fear of liability and costs, human
resources personnel might not as vigorously question a
candidate’s past work experience or follow-up on the contents
of a resume’s work history and this might lead to employers
hiring poor applicants.176
The floodgate concern appears overstated. First, the
District of Columbia appears to be the exception that proves
the rule in terms of the scope of the anti-unemployment
discrimination legislation. Besides the District of Columbia, the
states that have enacted anti-unemployment discrimination
legislation have all restricted the statutes to regulating job
advertisements.177 And, as is illustrated by the discussion of
California’s legislative history in particular and the current
status of the pending bills in general, it is unlikely that the
broader bills will pass.178
Second, the passed statutes prohibit a practice that could
serve as a predicate for a Title VII disparate impact claim.179
The easy-to-follow bright line rule might actually reduce
litigation given that an employer that uses candidates’
employment status in hiring decisions might violate existing
federal law if it has the effect of discriminating against a
constitutionally-protected class under a disparate impact
theory. With that said, even if an employer complies with the
job advertisement restrictions of the New Jersey and Oregon
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Compare D.C. CODE § 32-1362, with OR. LAWS ch. 85, § 2 (West
2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-1 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.855
(West 2011).
178. See supra notes 56-94 and accompanying text.
179. D.C. CODE § 32-1362; OR. LAWS ch. 85, § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B1; OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.855.
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statutes, they might still be liable under Title VII.180 But, to
the extent that a viable disparate impact claim was present,
the new laws do not change that.
Third, state legislatures and agencies have examined the
problem and their findings generally do not suggest that the
anti-unemployment discrimination legislation would lead to a
significant increase in litigation. For example, the California
Assembly Committee on Appropriations estimated that there
might be several thousand cases a year but, for fiscal purposes,
the California Senate Appropriations Committee suggested
that only about 250 cases would be filed for investigation and
determination by the administrative agency tasked with
handling employment discrimination claims.181 The District of
Columbia estimated that there would be about 150 new cases a
year.182
Fourth, the majority of bills—and all three of the enacted
statutes—do not permit a private right of action.183 Thus,
focusing on the potential for spurious suits by individuals is an
attack against a straw man.
Fifth, as discussed below, employers may still take into
account employment status where it is appropriate or
necessary as a bona fide qualification.184 Companies, therefore,
should not be constrained from making diligent inquiries into
their candidates’ histories. And this implies that there should
be little additional negligent-hiring liability exposure.

180. New State Law Further Regulates Hiring, FISHER & PHILIPS LLP
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.laborlawyers.com/15041.
181. See REPORT OF THE CAL. ASSEMB. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS (Apr.
25, 2012); CAL. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. FISCAL SUMMARY (Aug. 16,
2012).
182. Letter from Natwar M. Gandhi, Chief Fin. Officer, Washington,
D.C., to the Hon. Kwame R. Brown, Chairman, Council of D.C. (Jan. 25,
2012).
183. See supra notes 25-94 and accompanying text.
184. D.C. CODE § 32-1362; OR. LAWS ch. 85, § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B1; OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.855.
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Concern that Legislation Will Prevent Proper Vetting
of Candidates

The pro-employer faction also has argued that the antiunemployment discrimination laws will alter how employers
approach the hiring process, limiting what employers will ask
about candidates’ work histories.185 For example, in its
opposition to the California bill, the California Chamber of
Commerce explained that the bill
would place employers in the impossible
situation of either: (1) investigating an
applicant’s most recent employment, including
the reasons for the separation of his/her
employment with the employer and potentially
face an administrative claim or litigation for the
alleged violation of AB 1450 if the applicant is
ultimately not hired; or (2) forego any
investigation into the most recent employment of
the applicant to prevent a claim that he/she was
discriminated against on the basis of the
applicant’s “unemployed status,” and risk a
potential negligent hiring claim on the backend
for hiring an at-risk employee that the employer
knew or should have known was a potential
danger.186
Likewise, Proskauer Rose has asserted that employers
might raise suspicions by concentrating on gaps in a
candidate’s work history and, therefore, “commonplace
interview or application questions concerning unaccounted-for
time on a resume may become scarce.” 187
185. See Katharine H. Parker & Daniel L. Saperstein, The Tide Turns
Against Background Checks: How Employers Should Approach the Screening
of Applicants and Employees, 18 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRACTICAL GUIDANCE 4
(2010); CAL. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES
(Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES].
186. SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES, supra note 185.
187. Parker & Saperstein, supra note 185.
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These arguments do not apply to the New Jersey and
Oregon legislation because these statutes do not prohibit an
employer from using employment history as part of the hiring
criteria.188 But even as to the District of Columbia antiunemployment discrimination law, the strength of these
arguments is questionable because it explicitly permits an
employer to examine the reasons underlying an individual’s
status as unemployed in assessing an individual’s ability to
perform a job or in otherwise making employment decisions
about that individual.189 The bona fide occupational
qualification exception is well established, as it also appears in
the Title VII and ADEA statutes.190
Furthermore, it is not obvious that there is a strong link
between an individual’s employment status and his or her
abilities. At the EEOC hearing, Professor Norton explained
that current employment status probably is a poor proxy for
quality job performance given that one might be unemployed
for reasons unrelated to one’s skills.191 Specifically, Professor
Norton notes that one might have been in school or a training
program, had to leave a job because of spousal relocation, lost a
job because of lack of seniority during employer downsizing or
because the employer eliminated an entire division or shut
down altogether, or left employment temporarily due to illness,
injury,
disability,
pregnancy,
or
family
care-giving
192
responsibilities.
Professor Norton also stated that current
employment is a poor proxy for relevant experience because the
candidate might have been unemployed because he or she has
been in school receiving training.193
Putting aside the efficacy issues of using employment
status in hiring decisions, courts do have some experience
grappling with the use of unemployment status as a proxy for
characteristics that are not constitutionally-protected in the

188. OR. LAWS ch. 85, § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-1; OR. REV. STAT. §
659A.855.
189. D.C. CODE § 32-1364(b).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(f); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (West 2008).
191. See Transcript of EEOC Meeting, supra note 90.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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context of Batson challenges. Some courts have focused on the
link between unemployment status and susceptibility to other
forms of discrimination.194 But other courts have approached
the use of an individual’s lack of current employment as being
a legitimate proxy for analytic ability, responsibility, and
having ties to the community.195 Accordingly, to the extent that
a candidate’s employment history raised questions about these
factors, it is likely that a potential employer would be able to
ask about the candidate’s employment history without fear of
liability under the anti-unemployment discrimination statutes.
F.

The Rise of Anti-Unemployment Discrimination
Legislation and Interest Convergence

The anti-unemployment discrimination bills appear to be
part of a trend of legislation and regulation that prohibits
employers from using criteria that disproportionately impact
vulnerable individuals without being clearly tied to legitimate
qualifications. For example, the EEOC has issued guidance
that sets forth its view that the use of criminal history in hiring
decisions might have a disparate impact on candidates who are
members of racial minority groups, particularly black and

194. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Mississippi, 811 So. 2d 471, 476-77 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2002) (Irving, J., concurring) (“Clearly denying unemployed persons
a right to serve on the jury in Mississippi operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of African Americans since, as already observed, more African
Americans, percentage wise, are unemployed than European Americans.”);
Bowie v. Mississippi, 816 So. 2d 425, 430 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (Irving, J.,
concurring) (“I continue to believe that excluding a juror from jury service
because he is unemployed is discrimination based on economic status.”); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting Brown v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1984) (“Victims of
employment discrimination are frequently unemployed—many times as the
result of the alleged discrimination.”).
195. See United States v. Carr, 67 F.3d 171 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming
dismissal of African American juror based on unemployment status because
it evinced a lack of stake in the community); United States v. Brown, No.
8:03CR289, 2009 WL 962246, at *3 (D. Neb. Apr. 7, 2009) (affirming
dismissal of juror based on unemployment status); People v. Hecker, 942
N.E.2d 248 (N.Y. 2010) (noting approval of dismissal of juror for lack of
employment history because it demonstrated a lack of “decision-making
responsibilities”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4

36

2013] NEITHER PANACEA, PLACEBO, NOR POISON 1043
Latino men.196 In the same vein, New York prohibits employers
from discriminating against candidates with criminal
convictions unless there is a direct relationship between the
previous offense and the position or if hiring the applicant
would create an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety
of the general public.197 Additionally, the use of credit checks in
employment decisions has received increased scrutiny. Again,
the EEOC has questioned whether the use of credit checks
might have an adverse impact on female and minority
candidates.198 And the federal government and several states
have limited how employers may use credit checks in hiring.199
To the extent that the primary effect of the antiunemployment discrimination legislation might be to protect
vulnerable members of constitutionally protected groups from
discrimination, the theory of interest convergence might
explain its rise. In general, with regard to employment
discrimination, the interest convergence theory suggests that
states protect minorities only when doing so also promotes the
interests of the majority.200 Recall that thirty-two percent of the

196. Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment
Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT GUIDE (Apr. 25, 2012),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf.
197. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2007).
198. See Pre-Employment Inquiries and Credit Rating or Economic
Status,
EQUAL
EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_credit.cfm (last visited Apr. 23,
2013).
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (West 2006); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5
(West 2012); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
Empl. § 3-711 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320 (West 2012); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt (West 2011); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/15 (West
2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.182.020 (West 2007).
200. See Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title
VII After Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW.
L.J. 937, 940 (2005); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and
Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L. J. 1757, 1764 (2003); Joseph
C. Feldman, Note, Standing and Delivering on Title VII's Promises: White
Employees' Ability to Sue Employers for Discrimination Against Nonwhites,
25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 569, 600 (1999) (“For many whites, before
they endorse policies that benefit nonwhites and make the possibility of Title
VII suits a real deterrent to employers who would discriminate, they must

37

1044

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

total respondents in a national Gallup poll identified
“unemployment/jobs” as the most important problem facing the
country today.201 And, while black, Hispanic, senior, and lowincome respondents are particularly concerned about
unemployment, it is an issue that cuts across all segments.202
IV. Conclusion
Unemployment is a significant issue in contemporary
America. But the rise of anti-unemployment discrimination
legislation does not appear to address the scarcity of jobs and,
thus, is unlikely to reduce unemployment in the aggregate.
However, the legislation might have an overall positive effect
by reducing arbitrary discrimination in hiring and long-term
unemployment, which have negative impacts on the economy.
Additionally, the legislation expresses a set of social values
about fairness and hard work. And the legislation protects
members of constitutionally-protected groups who likely are
disproportionately
impacted
by
current-employment
requirements. In sum, an objective look at anti-unemployment
discrimination reveals that it is a positive example of interest
convergence that might not have all the benefits that its
proponents claim but is not just a placebo and also has very
little—if any—downside.

believe that their own self-interests are furthered.”); Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523-24 (1980) (arguing that the “interest of blacks in
achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with
the interests of whites”).
201. See Most Important Problem, supra note 9.
202. Saad, supra note 12.
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